

THE DILEMMA OF PROTECTING DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE CASE OF CYPRUS.

Przemysław Osiewicz

Assoc. Prof.

Adam Mickiewicz University

This work was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under Grant 2018/31/B/HS5/01410 [Contentious Politics and Neo-Militant Democracy].

Abstract

The main objective of the article is to specify the reasons why, unlike in other EU countries affected by the financial crisis, no restrictions on civil liberties, characteristic of the neo-militant democracy, were introduced in the Republic of Cyprus. These liberties include the limitation to the freedom of assembly, the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech, the freedom of association, and the freedom of religion. The author applied qualitative source analysis as the main research technique. The analysed publications include legal acts adopted by the legislative and executive bodies of the Republic of Cyprus between 2012 and 2019 as well as reports of various non-governmental organizations monitoring respect for civil liberties in Cyprus. The study covers the period between 2012 and 2019. The initial turning point is the year of a sudden financial meltdown and the consequent budget problems, banking system crisis and social unrest. In turn, the final turning point was 2019, namely the last year before the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic. The article contributes to research on the concept of neo-militant democracy in contemporary European countries in the context of the functioning of the Republic of Cyprus during the financial crisis.

Keywords: Cyprus, financial crisis, democracy, neo-militant democracy, civil liberties.

Introduction

The post-2008 financial crisis triggered a decline in production, a significant increase in unemployment, a serious reduction in social policies and social discontent in the EU. Although most of these factors were of economic importance, the difficult situation also translated into political consequences. The governments of European countries affected by the effects of the crisis faced the dilemma of how to protect their democratic systems against a sudden increase in the radicalization of citizens' attitudes and the growing popularity of populist groups. They also faced an important dilemma in the field of political philosophy. How much freedom can be taken from citizens in order to secure the democratic foundations and respect for values, and at the same time prevent the unintended transformation of the regime into the authoritarian one. One of the European Union member states hardest hit by the financial crisis was the Republic of Cyprus. The country which, when it joined the EU in 2004, was the undisputed leader among the ten new members in terms of economic development, suddenly found itself on the brink of bankruptcy.¹

The government of the Cypriot state faced the necessity to carry out a series of unpopular economic reforms, which resulted in an increase in social discontent. In March 2013, the decision to bail-in

¹ Katsourides, Y., in *The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis in Southern Europe: A Comparative Reappraisal*, Morlino, L., Sottillotta, C.E., (Editors), Institutional Inertia, Ignorance and Short-Circuit: Cyprus. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. p. 36-37.

insured depositors came as a huge surprise and caused a shock among Cypriots and foreign investors.² The surprise was all the greater, because drastic solutions of cutting costs and freezing assets were so far associated primarily with authoritarian states, and not with a democratic state in which citizens should be able to count on the protection of their savings from state banking supervision institutions. Thus, both the European Union institutions and individual member states, as well as the executive bodies of the Republic of Cyprus, adopted a plan that not only undermined the financial credibility of the state, but could also be interpreted as a violation of the social contract.

Political and economic crises foster radicalization of political attitudes, and at the same time may be used by governments to introduce legal restrictions of political rights and liberties. Some authors pointed to an increase in the threat to the stability of democratic systems as a result of crises.³ The Cypriot austerity measures could have also led to an outbreak of social discontent and protests. In addition, they could have strengthened the internal enemies of the democratic regime or might have resulted in the emergence of anti-democratic political movements. Undoubtedly, Cyprus faced the dilemma of securing a democratic system and, at the same time, stabilizing the banking system and the budget balance. Yet its government did not decide to follow other EU member states and did not introduce any restrictions to civil liberties. What were the main reasons for this phenomenon?

The study contributes to research on neo-militant democracy and is an attempt to find an answer to the question why, despite the risk of a threat to the democratic foundations of the state during the crisis, the government of the Republic of Cyprus did not decide to limit civil liberties, although such restrictions were introduced by governments of other EU countries to protect political regimes. The analysis allows a better understanding of the mechanisms of limiting civil liberties by governments in the name of protecting democratic standards.

1. Theoretical assumptions

The dilemma of choosing between securing a democratic political system and the simultaneous need to provide citizens with the widest possible spectrum of freedom is not a new phenomenon. Observation of the gradual degradation of the Weimar Republic system during the great world economic crisis and the rise of the Nazis to power in the 1930's prompted Karl Loewenstein to introduce the concept of militant democracy. In his opinion, fascism was based on emotionalism which was a substitute for the rule of law and was the opposite of a rational constitutional regime.⁴ Loewenstein also suggested breaking with democratic fundamentalism and using legal instruments to protect democratic regimes and weaken fascist movements. He pointed to a catalogue of available restrictions referring to freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the right to peaceful assembly.⁵

It was the openness of European societies and the unlimited ability to compete for power by various political parties that opened the way to power for populist and fascist groups, which skilfully appealed to the emotions and needs of citizens. The difficult economic situation, high unemployment, and growing ethnic antagonisms only made the task of the enemies of the democratic regime easier. That was the experience of most European societies in the 1930's. Already then, supporters of democracy wondered how to limit the possibilities of anti-democratic forces, while maintaining the democratic system and fundamental freedoms. In the opinion of Max Steuer, the main assumption behind the

² Hardouvelis, G.A., in *The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis*, Michaelides A., Orphanides A. (Editors), *Overcoming the crisis in Cyprus*. Imperial College Press, 2016, p. 246.

³ Krugman, P., "The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008", W. W. Norton & Company 2009. Rak, J., "Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence in Times of Austerity: Studying Social Movements in Comparative Perspective", Routledge 2018. Zestos, G.K., "The Global Financial Crisis: From US Subprime Mortgages to European Sovereign Debt", Routledge, 2016.

⁴ Loewenstein, K., "Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe, I", 4, "American Political Science Review", 1935.

⁵ Loewenstein, K., "Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights", 3, "The American Political Science Review", 1937. p. 423-424.

introduction of militant democracy was the conviction that unlimited freedom in democratic systems could be used by its enemies to seize power and introduce an authoritarian system.⁶

The definition of militant democracy gradually evolved, which was an attempt to adapt the classic concept of militant democracy to new circumstances and conditions.⁷ Over time, along with the increase in the number of potential threats to democratic states, they started introducing new measures of limiting civil rights and freedoms. Researchers also began to formulate definitions of neo-militant democracy. Joanna Rak, for instance, defines a neo-militant democracy as a political and legal structure in which the civil liberties of individuals are limited in order to eliminate the threat of changing this system using legal means.⁸ She also distinguishes the number of indicators constituting neo-militant democracy. The list includes the limitations of the freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion, passive voting rights, active voting rights, referendum organization, legislation on counterterrorism and anti-terrorism, anti-extremism, the limitation of registration and functioning of political parties, restrictions on acquisition of citizenship, and access to public employment.⁹ The detection of restrictions within the above indicators makes it possible to determine whether a given democratic system is evolving towards a neo-militant democracy or not. For the purpose of this article, the changes in the restrictions of fundamental civil liberties in the Republic of Cyprus between 2012 and 2019 are taken into account. These liberties include the limitation to the freedom of assembly, the freedom of the press, the freedom of speech, the freedom of association, and the freedom of religion.

The main objective of the article is to specify the reasons why, unlike in other EU countries affected by the financial crisis, no restrictions on civil liberties, characteristic of the neo-militant democracy, were introduced in the Republic of Cyprus. The study draws on qualitative source analysis. The sources include legal acts adopted by the legislative and executive bodies of the Republic of Cyprus between 2012 and 2019, selected academic articles as well as reports of non-governmental organizations monitoring respect for civil liberties in Cyprus.

The study covers the period between 2012 and 2019. The initial turning point is the year of a sudden financial meltdown and the consequent budget problems, banking system crisis and social unrest. In turn, the final turning point was 2019, namely the last year before the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Considering 2020 could be confusing due to the numerous temporary restrictions on civil liberties and rights introduced to guarantee sanitary safety. Thus, they could not be analysed in relation to the effects of the financial crisis after 2012 as a new phase of the duration of political structures began with its own specificity and dynamics.

2. Empirical evidence: An analysis of key civil freedoms in Cyprus

The lack of new restrictions on civil liberties in the discussed period does not mean that such measures were not introduced before the crisis. In the pre-crisis period, however, restrictions were placed mainly due to the Cyprus issue and numerous tensions between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. This was reflected in the Act on Combating of Racism and Other Discrimination of 2011.¹⁰ The provisions contained in this document allowed for a broad interpretation of actions aimed against a given ethnic group and for punishing people who would undermine, for example, the Greek Cypriot negotiating position or their interpretation of historical facts related to the Cyprus question. A similarly broad interpretation of the regulations to the potential detriment of Turkish Cypriots and Turks was introduced in the Act on the prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist

⁶ Steuer, M., in *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies*, Romaniuk, S., Thapa, M., Marton, P., *Militant democracy*, Palgrave Macmillan 2019. p. 2.

⁷ Thiel, M., "The 'Militant Democracy' Principle in Modern Democracies" Routledge 2009). p. 4.

⁸ Rak, J., "Conceptualizing the Theoretical Category of Neo-militant Democracy", 2, "Polish Political Science", 2020, p. 65.

⁹ Rak, cf. Footnote 8, p. 65.

¹⁰ Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by means of Criminal Law of 2011. 2011. Law No. 134(I)/2011, <https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/16288> [L. s. 27.05.2021].

financing law of 2007.¹¹ The activities of various Turkish Cypriot NGOs or religious organizations, reluctantly tolerated by the government, could be classified as money laundering due to the flow of funds from or to areas beyond the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus.

The situation changed significantly in 2012, when the Cyprus issue was relegated to the background and macroeconomic issues became the most important. At the same time, the main problem in communication between the decision-making elite and the public emerged. Cyprus is a unique state due to the actual division of the territory and the resulting socio-political problems. Successive governments of the Republic of Cyprus practice specific public diplomacy, in which the issues of external threats posed by Turkey, sense of injustice, and collective memory play an important role. Until 2012, it was mainly Turkish and Turkish Cypriots who were responsible for the internal problems and posed a threat to the stability of the Republic of Cyprus, not the Greek Cypriots themselves. Such a narrative worked at critical moments, also to distract citizens from the current challenges and difficulties. Thus, in the post-crisis period, no positive ways of reaching recipients and appropriate communication of the need to implement austerity measures were developed. As a result, citizens were reluctant to accept the government's arguments and it could not count on public support for the implemented reforms.¹²

The social situation in Cyprus became complex and the decision-making elite operated without sufficient social support. The government could thus expect an increase in social discontent and the emergence of anti-democratic forces, as was the case in many other EU countries at that time. And, following the example of these countries, they could attempt to limit civil liberties. Yet no such restrictions were imposed. Why did the government neither strengthen nor impose new restrictions of civil liberties?

Citizens can express their dissatisfaction with the political and social situation by participating in various forms of protests. It is a measure that politicians representing the ruling groups fear most as mass protests often get out of hand. One can notice that freedom of assembly is constitutionally guaranteed, and generally respected and characteristic of democratic regimes. Yet problems often arise in times of crisis, when executive bodies are tempted to restrict freedom of assembly under various pretexts, for example, threats to public order, traffic obstruction or sanitary restrictions. In this context, it is worth pointing out that, unlike in many EU member states, no legal act was adopted that would restrict the right to assembly in the post-crisis period in the Republic of Cyprus. It resulted from the relatively low number of protests and their very limited scale. In addition, social solidarity was also not visible, and only those who were directly affected by new restrictions or legal changes protested against them. Trans-sectional solidarity was not noticeable. Cypriots did not trust politicians as they remembered many unfulfilled promises and attempts to settle the Cyprus issue. Protests in the past did not lead to the postulated changes but were skilfully used by politicians to seize power.¹³ Thus, given the lack of significant protests, the situation of the state decision-making elite in Cyprus was much more comfortable than that of those in Greece, France or Spain. In these states socially unpopular reforms led to mass protests and the simultaneous restrictions of the freedom of assembly. The Cypriot citizens, in turn, did not give the government any excuse to restrict this freedom. As a consequence, this indicator, characteristic of neo-militant democracy, did not occur in Cyprus either during the crisis or in the period after it due to the passive attitude of civil society. Citizens did not threaten neither democracy nor the rulers and were not treated as potential enemies. The government was not put under public pressure and therefore did not introduce restrictions on this freedom.

¹¹ Act on the prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing law of 2007. 2007. Law No. 188(I)/2007, https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8466/file/Cyprus_money_laundering_terrorist_financing_2007_am2018_en.pdf [L. s. 27.05.2021].

¹² Papaioannou, T.; Hajimichael, M. "Paradise Lost: Media Representation and the 2013 Financial and Political Crises in Cyprus", 1, "The Cyprus Review", 2015, p. 16.

¹³ Ioannou, G.; Charalambous, G., "The social and political impact of the Cyprus economic crisis (2010-2017)" Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/14901.pdf>, 2017 [L. s. 21.05.2021].

As in the case of freedom of assembly, no attempts were made to restrict the freedom of the press by legislation. The passivity of the media can be indicated as the main reason. A research conducted by Freedom House showed that despite unpopular and costly reforms, the Cypriot media had not exerted pressure on decision-makers.¹⁴ One may wonder, however, whether the negligible number and relatively small scale of the protests were the result of the lack of access to reliable information or the lack of critical engagement of the media was the result of a relatively passive attitude of the society. Nevertheless, it can be stated that, while there were no attempts to legally restrict the freedom of the press, there were several incidents that could indicate that politicians indirectly influenced the media.¹⁵ In 2013, for instance, an advertisement prepared by the Pancypriot Citizens' Movement against the consequences of the bailout agreement was blocked from airing by the Radio-Television Authority. The official reason was the threat of violating the personal rights of one of the leading government politicians, but analysts said the real cause was open and sharp criticism of the commitments made by Cyprus as part of the stabilization of the euro area.¹⁶ Some researchers also pointed to the growing problem of self-censorship among journalists at that time.¹⁷ Research on media freedom in Cyprus shows that although freedom of the press is generally observed, politicians often try to exert pressure on journalists and their editorial offices.¹⁸ However, the incidents mentioned above cannot lead to the conclusion that press freedom in Cyprus has been restricted during the crisis or in subsequent years. No change to this indicator, which would be characteristic of neo-militant democracy, was recorded in the analysed period. The main reason was the fact that the media did not exert significant pressure on the government with reference to the austerity measures. It was mainly the result of a high degree of subordination of the media, especially public ones, to the government or dominant political parties.

In Cyprus, the freedom of expression is also constitutionally guaranteed. On the basis of article 19, "every person has the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form".¹⁹ In 2012-2019, no legislation was adopted that would limit the freedom of speech, and thus hinder or prevent open criticism of the actions taken by the government. Similar to freedom of assembly and freedom of the press, low civic participation resulted in the government not introducing measures to restrict freedom of speech. Public criticism was not of an organized, mass, and institutionalized nature.²⁰ Thus, the government did not have to take any decisive actions and did not restrict this freedom.

Neither have any elements typical of neo-militant democracy been introduced in the area of freedom of association. This constitutionally guaranteed freedom is also generally observed in the Republic of Cyprus. There were no legislative attempts to block the creation of associations or other types of organizations in the post-crisis period, although following reports from other EU countries affected by the crisis, especially Greece, the government of the Republic of Cyprus had to take into account the emergence of anti-governmental interest groups. Yet such a phenomenon did not occur in Cyprus. The activities of the existing non-governmental organizations and trade unions did not exert any significant pressure on the executive bodies, and thus the need to block their activities was not noticed. There were also no attempts to create new entities of this type.²¹ In this case, one can point to a correlation with a relatively low level of citizen activity during and after the crisis which were presented earlier in the article.

¹⁴ "Censorship and self-censorship in Cyprus" Resource Centre on Media Freedom in Europe. <https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Censorship-and-self-censorship-in-Cyprus>, 2021 [L. s. 20.05.2021].

¹⁵ Gage, A.G., "Cyprus" Free Speech and Free Press Around the World, <https://freespeechfreepress.wordpress.com/cyprus/>, 2020 [L. s. 21.05.2021].

¹⁶ cf. Footnote 14.

¹⁷ Iordanidou, S.; Takas, E.; Vatikiotis, L.; Garcia, P., "Constructing Silence: Processes of Journalistic (Self-) Censorship during Memoranda in Greece, Cyprus, and Spain", 1, "Media and Communication", 2020.

¹⁸ Christophorou, C.; Spyridou, L.P., "Cyprus" Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, <https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2016-results/cyprus/>, 2016 [L. s. 26.05.2021].

¹⁹ Article 19, Cyprus's Constitution of 1960 with Amendments through 2013, 2021.

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013.pdf?lang=en, 2021 [L. s. 17.05.2021].

²⁰ Gage, cf. Footnote 15.

²¹ "Cyprus: Freedom in the World" Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cyprus/freedom-world/2020#CL>, 2020 [L. s. 18.05.2021].

The last indicator is freedom of religion. It is also constitutionally guaranteed and generally respected in Cyprus. Orthodox Christians in the Republic of Cyprus clearly dominate and enjoy various privileges, such as teaching religion in a public school. The 1960 constitution also guarantees the rights of Muslims, who until 1974 constituted a significant religious group, and now the vast majority of them live in the northern parts of the island which are not controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. However, no legislation that could be classified as an attempt to limit the freedom of religion was adopted between 2012 and 2019. What is more, the causes of the crisis were purely of economic nature and they did not arise from the tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which are mainly ethnic-based. Any sectarian discrimination or incident is related to the unsettled disputes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and not to the economic situation on the island.

Conclusion

Before the financial crisis, there were elements typical of the neo-militant democracy in the Cypriot legislation, but they mainly related to the unresolved Cyprus issue and ethnic tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, the level of restrictions was relatively low, and civil liberties were guaranteed. The situation did not change after 2012, when the financial crisis began and the severe austerity measures were introduced. The main reason for this phenomenon was a relatively low social resistance to the new fiscal, banking, and budgetary policies. It was not organized and of a mass nature even though the state was on the verge of bankruptcy. One could notice the society's fatigue with political problems related to the unsettled Cyprus question and a lack of trust in politicians who made empty promises regarding this problem for many years. The decades of unfulfilled promises and the fruitless protests certainly resulted in a significant decline in political and social activity on the part of citizens during the financial crisis after 2012. The outbreak of this crisis coincided with another unsuccessful round of negotiations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegations. Over a hundred meetings of negotiators representing both sides took place between 2008 and 2011, with no progress on the key contentious issues.²² Public opinion was tired of reports of successive failures, and at the same time citizens were losing faith in the driving force of politics. The many years of activity of various non-governmental organizations and periodic protests did not bring practically any results, and certainly did not translate into approximating negotiating positions. Cypriot citizens had to be convinced that also their actions in response to the anti-crisis measures introduced by the government would be equally ineffective. Therefore, the solutions or financial obligations introduced by the government did not encounter significant social resistance and therefore it was not in the position to limit civil liberties between 2012 and 2019.

One should also pay attention to the fact that in no other EU country affected by the post-2008 financial crisis has there been a parallel problem of pending and long-standing dispute between the two communities, which has been and continues to be the main point of reference for Cypriot politicians and the public opinion. This factor also contributed to a significant decline in citizens' trust in politicians and the loss of faith in the effectiveness of political activities.

The study shows the main reasons for the lack of restrictions on civil liberties in Cyprus in the post-financial crisis period and complements research on neo-militant democracy in contemporary Europe. The government decided not to limit these freedoms, because it did not perceive citizens as a threat to the stability of the democratic regime. Thus, it was not faced with the dilemma of how much freedom to take from society to secure the duration of the democratic system.

²² Michael, S.M.; Vural, Y., in *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict*, Michael M.S., Vural, Y. (Editors), *A new approach to an old conflict: Identifying the problem and imagining the solution*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018. p. 7.

Bibliography

1. Act on the prevention and suppression of money laundering and terrorist financing law of 2007, 2007, Law No. 188(I)/2007, https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8466/file/Cyprus_money_laundering_terrorist_financing_2007_am2018_en.pdf [Last seen 27.05.2021];
2. Censorship and self-censorship in Cyprus, Resource Centre on Media Freedom in Europe, 2021, <https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Censorship-and-self-censorship-in-Cyprus> [Last seen 20.05.2021];
3. Christophorou, Christophoros. Spyridou, Lia-Paschalia. Cyprus. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2016, <https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2016-results/cyprus/> [Last seen 26.05.2021];
4. Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by means of Criminal Law of 2011, 2011, Law No. 134(I)/2011, <https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/16288> [Last seen 27.05.2021];
5. Cyprus: Freedom in the World, Freedom House, 2020, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cyprus/freedom-world/2020#CL> [Last seen 18.05.2021];
6. Cyprus's Constitution of 1960 with Amendments through 2013, Constitute Project, 2021, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013.pdf?lang=en [Last seen 17.05.2021];
7. Gage, Abigail G. Cyprus, Free Speech and Free Press Around the World, 2020, <https://freespeechfreepress.wordpress.com/cyprus/> [Last seen 21.05.2021];
8. Hardouvelis, Gikas A. "Overcoming the crisis in Cyprus" in *The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis*, ed. Alexander Michaelides, Athanasios Orphanides. London: Imperial College Press, 2016;
9. Ioannou, Gregoris. Charalambous, Giorgos. The social and political impact of the Cyprus economic crisis (2010-2017), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/14901.pdf> [Last seen 21.05.2021];
10. Iordanidou, Sofia. Takas, Emmanouil. Vatikiotis, Leonidas. Garcia, Pedro. "Constructing Silence: Processes of Journalistic (Self-)Censorship during Memoranda in Greece, Cyprus, and Spain", *Media and Communication* 8, no. 1, 2020;
11. Krugman, Paul. *The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009;
12. Katsourides, Yiannos. "Institutional Inertia, Ignorance and Short-Circuit: Cyprus" in *The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis in Southern Europe: A Comparative Reappraisal*, ed. Leonardo Morlino, Cecilia Emma Sottillotta. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020;
13. Loewenstein, Karl. "Autocracy Versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe, I", *American Political Science Review*, 29, no. 4, 1935;
14. Loewenstein, Karl. "Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights", *The American Political Science Review*, 31, no. 3, 1937;
15. Michael, Michális S., Vural, Yücel. "A new approach to an old conflict: Identifying the problem and imagining the solution" in *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict*, ed. Michális S. Michael, Yücel Vural. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018;
16. Papaioannou, Tao. Hajimichael, Mike. "Paradise Lost: Media Representation and the 2013 Financial and Political Crises in Cyprus", *The Cyprus Review* 27, no. 1, 2015;
17. Rak, Joanna. *Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence in Times of Austerity: Studying Social Movements in Comparative Perspective*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018;
18. Rak, Joanna. "Conceptualizing the Theoretical Category of Neo-militant Democracy", *Polish Political Science Yearbook* 49, no. 2, 2020;
19. Steuer, Max. "Militant democracy" in *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies*, ed. Scott Romaniuk, Manish Thapa, Peter Marton. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019;
20. Thiel, Markus. *The 'Militant Democracy' Principle in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge, 2009;
21. Zestos, George K., *The Global Financial Crisis: From US Subprime Mortgages to European Sovereign Debt*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.